Dynamic design of a reliable computer network on using information theory  by Choudhury, P.P.
PERGAMON Computers and Mathematics with Applications 38 (1999) 103-118 
An International Journal 
computers & 
mathematics 
with appl lcdone 
Dynamic Design of a Reliable Computer 
Network on Using Information Theory 
P. P. CHOUDHURY 
Applied Statistics Unit, Indian Statistical Institute 
Calcutta-700 035, India 
(Received December 1997; accepted January 1998) 
Abstract - -There  exists a graph theoretic model of self-diagnosable system by Preparata et al. [1]. 
Using a corresponding information theoretic model, a reliability measure of a computer network was 
obtained [2]. Based on the a priori probability of failure of different computers and edge weights 
assigned for some test outcomes, probabilistically t-reliable system is chaxacterised. Next optimal 
design of p - t reliable system is given. The associated design issues linked with dynamic environment 
are also highlighted. (~) 1999 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved. 
Keywords--Information theory, Entropy, Probabilistic fault-diagnosis, Reliability, Computer net~ 
work. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The major trend in the information technology during the 1990s is the growth of networking. 
A computer network essentially means a collection of different computer systems at various ge- 
ographic locations with increased cooperation between them. Networks are dynamically config- 
ured. As each new server is added, it will make itself known to the computer network through a 
registration procedure in which the server tells the network about its capabilities, billing policies, 
accessibility, and so forth. Clients may then use the servers as needed according to the terms 
described uring registration. Such a network system is characterised with following features. 
(i) Incremental extensibility of the installation under a uniform software system. 
(ii) Simplification of system software and application software. 
(iii) Through the implementation f parallel processing, reduction of 'semantic gap' between 
available hardware support and the features of high level programming languages. 
(iv) Automatic detection of faulty computer system and its virtual disconnection from the rest 
of the computer network. 
The fourth feature is one of the aims towards the reliable computer network system design. A 
general model of a reliable computer network would take into account he probabilistic nature 
of the occurrence of faults in different computer systems. This is because the complex computer 
systems at various geographic locations are from different echnologies and so failure probabilities 
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of different computer systems are likely to differ. Further, a measure of reliability of a computer 
network is the probability Pc of correctly identifying the faulty computer systems [3]. 
It was von Neumann's conviction voiced over many years that faults should be treated by 
thermodynamical theory as information has been by the theory of Shanon. In this context, an 
attempt was made to take help from information theory for the analysis and design of diagnosable 
systems [4]. In line with these ideas, we want to fix the reliability measure of a computer 
network. The information theoretic preliminaries for this purpose are presented in Section 2, 
while the corresponding information theoretic model is proposed in Section 3. Analysis of this 
model in Section 4 establishes the fundamental theorem of p - t reliability. Section 5 provides 
the optimal design issues of the p - t reliable system. Section 6 enumerates the results of other 
self-diagnosable system models from information theoretic approach. Finally, Section 7 specifies 
concluding remarks which includes dynamic design solutions. 
2. INFORMATION THEORET IC  PREL IMINARIES  
A information channel is a statistical model of the medium through which signal passes. A 
channel with input symbol set A = {ai} (i - 1, 2 , . . . ,  q) and output symbol set B = {bj} (j = 
1, 2 , . . . ,  s) (where p(ai) and p(bj) are the probability of occurrence of the symbols) can be char- 
acterised by the following parameters [5]. 
p(bj I ai) = conditional probability that output symbol will be bj if input symbol is ai = 
channel probability. 
p(ai, bj) = probability of pair of symbols ai and bj = p(ai).p(bj [ ai) hence, 
Ep(a i ,  bj) = p(ai). (1) 
J 
Using log Base 2; 
q 1 
H(A) = entropy of source symbols = j=IE p(ai) log P(ai) ; 
s 1 
H(B) = entropy of received symbols = Ep(bj ) log p('b ; 
J l 
q s 
H(A,B) = joint entropy = E E p(ai'bj) log 1 
i=1 j=l p(a~, bj)" 
Utilising 1, 
q 1 q 2._,x--~P(ai'bj)l°gp(bj H(A,B) = Ep(a i ) log~ + E 1 
i=1 i=1 j= l  ] a i ) '  
H(A, B) = g(g)  + H(B [ A). 
or  
(2) 
The conditional entropy H(B [ A) is called the noise entropy of the channel. It represents the 
information loss in the channel in going from input to output. It is how much must be added to 
the source entropy to get the joint entropy. 
3. AN INFORMATION THEORET IC  MODEL 
For the information theoretic model, we understand that a priori probability of failure Pi 
of a computer ui in the network is equal to the probability that the output signal from the 
computer (ui) will be incorrect while input signal to the same computer is correct. Based on 
the a priori probability of failure of different computers and the edge weights (0 or 1) assigned 





for some set of test outcomes, each of the test stimuli and test result signals is assigned with a 
probability of occurrence. For example, Figure 1 shows that the computer u j  has the capacity 
of testing the computer u~. During this diagnostic experiment, it is assumed that only fault free 




{a = 0} 
{a = 1} 
-{b = 0} 
{p= 1} 
{b = ~} =* 
testing computer is OK; 
testing computer is not OK. 
testing computer is OK and tested; 
computer sends OK signal; 
testing computer is OK and tested; 
computer sends NOT OK signal; 
{testing computer is not OK and the 
tested computer sends OK signal}; 
{testing computer is not OK and tested 
computer sends not OK signal}; 
{testing computer is not OK}. 
Thus, p(O/O) (see Figure 2a) means that given the correct test stimuli (0), the probability of 
getting 0 (i.e., the tested computer is fault free) is this probability p(O/O) = 1 - p~ where p~ is 
the probability of failure of the tested computer. Thus, p(1/0) = p~. 
p(O/O} = I-p! ~ )  
pit/O) = Pl p(O.l} = Pi 
p{O/O) - 1- p i 
( ~  p(O/O) = (1- pj )(1-Pl ) 
p(ltO) =Pi p ( ~  
p(x/1)=1 (~ 
p(1. X)"--p{1).p(X 11)~jj 
(a) (b) 
Figure 2. 
On the other hand, if the testing computer is faulty, we may or may not get the correct est 
stimuli out of the testing computer. See Figure 2b. Under this scenario, the joint probability of 
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getting correct est stimuli as well as the tested computer is fault free is p(0, 0) = (1 -p  j)(1 -P i ) ,  
where pj is the probability of failure of the testing computer. Similarly, the joint probability of 
getting correct est stimuli as well as the tested computer is faulty is p(0, 1) -- (1 - Pj)Pi. Next, 
the joint probability of incorrect est stimuli as well as unreliable test outcome about the tested 
computer is p(1, X) = pj. 
On the basis of these probability measures, we evaluate the average information (i.e., entropy) 
during diagnostic experiment and characterise a reliable network system. Each computer u~ is 
modeled as a channel ci connected to a sender Si and a receiver R~. A receiver- sender station 
Rj - Si represents he edge eji E E where the computer uj sends the test signal to the computer ui 
(Figure 1). Now depending on whether uj is one of the faulty computers or not, we have the 
following two cases. 
CASE (i). For uj E F (uj belonging to the fault free set of computers). Now the test stimuli 
is correctly applied from uj to test ui while the input symbol at S~ is assumed to be 0 with its 
probability p(0) = 1. As the test stimuli passes through Ci, at R~ we receive symbol 0 if uieF 
and 1 if uieF. The channel probabilities for this case are given by P(1/0) = probability of failure 
of the computer ui modelled as a channel Ci = p(ui) = p~, 
As per the notations introduced in Section 2 and shown in Figure 2a, P(O, 0) = (1 -p~), p(0, 1) = 
p~, A = {0}, B = {0, 1}. A is the event that the testing computer u3 is fault free, similarly B is 
the event that the tested computer may be fault free or faulty. 
Now, H(A) = O, H(A, B) = Pi log(1/pi) + (1 - pi) log(l/1 - Pi). Using equation (2), H(B I 
A) = H(A,  B) = H(B) .  
The noise entropy of the channel H(B I A) due to uncertainty in the channel Ci representing 
the computer ui while uj E fi' is denoted by H(ui) which can be seen as 
1 1 1 (3) H(B ] A) = H(ui) = H(B)  = p~ og ~ + (1 - Pi)log 1 - p-'--~." 
The slope of this entropy function denoted by w(ui) is given by 
w(u~) - dH(ui) _ log 1 -P i  (4) 
dpi Pi 
This can be viewed as the weight of the computer ui. w(ui) can be viewed as the weight of 
goodness (reliability) of the tested computer, as it is maximum at Pi = 0 and minimum at Pi = 1 
and it changes the sign (from +ve to -ve)  at Pi = 1/2, where the uncertainty is maximum. See 
Figure 3. 
CASE (ii). For uj E F(uj belonging to the faulty set of computers). Now the input symbol set 
A = {0, 1} with p(0) = 1 -p j  and p(1) = pj where input symbol 1 indicates that the test stimuli 
applied from uj is incorrect. As shown in Figure 2b, the output symbol set at R~ is given by 
B = {0, 1, X} where X denotes the invalid symbol that results if the test stimuli is incorrect. 
Now 
1 
P(0, 0) = (1 - pj)(1 - p~), 
P(0,1) = (1 -Pj)Pi ,  and p(1,X) =pj ,  
H(A)  = pj log 1 1 - -  + (1 -p j ) log  = H(uj),  
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1.0 
p 
F igure  3. 
1 
H(A, B) = (1 - pj)(1 - Pi) log (1 - pj)(1 - Pi) ~- (1 - Pj)Pi log 
+pj log 1 = g(uj) + (1 - pj)H(ui). 
P j  
(1 - Pj)Pi 
So, the noise entropy of the channel ci (i.e., computer vi) can be deduced as 
H(B IA  ) = (1 -p j )H(u i ) .  (5) 
Now assuming that the faults are statistically independent ofeach other, the slope of this entropy 
function is given by dH(BfA) = (1 -- pj)W(Ui). 
dp{ 
So now, (1 - pj)w(ui) is the weight of the computer ui. 
For the basic information theoretic model, we assume that any predecessor computer uj E 
F- lu i  can test the computer ui independently and self- testing of the computer is ignored. 
Under this situation slope of the noise entropy of channel C~ representing ui will be (1 -p  j)w (ui) 
only if F - lu i  C F (where F is the faulty set of computers). On the other hand, if there is a 
computer UkeF-lui r'~ F, then the value will be w(ui). So for any set F C V, the sum of the slope 
of the entropy function for each ujeF is given by 
= E + (1 - (6) 
ul eF, F -  l ui C_F u{ eF, F -  l ui C F 
ujeF-lui 
Thus, 
w(F) < (7) 
ui~F~ 
F-lui~F 
DEFINITION 1. Any subset of computer F C V is termed as consistent fault set [6] or legitimate 
fault set if test outcome for the test link eji is 1 for all uieF, ujeF, and test outcome for the test 
link ej~ is 0 for all ui, ujeF. 
For the purpose of fault diagnosis, it is important to consider the circumstances in which the 
most likely consistent or legitimate fault set is unique. 
P(F)-- l] (1-p~) 1-[ p~. 
uiE-F u~EF 
DEFINITION 2. A network system (V, E) is probabilistically t-fault reliable if for some test out- 
come there exists at most one consistent (or legitimate) fault set F c U such that p(F) >_ t where 
P(F)  denotes the a priori probability of occurrence of the set F. 
The priori probability of occurrence of the faulty set of computers F is given by 
1 1 < log 1 ~ log~- ~ lOgl_p--- ~_ 
uieF uleF 
F-lu~=F F-lu~CF 
E 1 -  E 1 
Pi 1 - p~ - 
uleF uieF 
F- lu~F F-lui~=F 
On using (6),(7), we note that this equation is true only if for any uieF, F- lui  ~ F because 
otherwise for any uieF with F-lui  C F, the test results for us is unreliable and as a result, 
evaluation of P(F)  based on Pi will be unreliable and invalid. However, in the event of F - lu i  C F 
in a system which is p - t reliable, ui will be definitely fault free with zero probability of failure. 
Now from P(F)  > t with F-lui ~ F for each ui~F, we have 
1 1 E l °g - -  E 




E log 1 -  p----~" 
ui EY 
(9) 
Denoting right-hand side by k(t), ~ u,~F log(1 -- Pi/P~) <-- k(t). So, in a p - t reliable system 
F-lui~=F 
there can be at most one consistent fault set F with the value of w(F) in the following range: 
O < w(F) <<_ E l og l -p i  <_ k(t). (8) 
Pi ul eF, 
F-lui~=F 
In PMC model [1], for any two sets of computers F1 and F2 with F1 t2 F2 = 
U D V. Let FI ~F2 = Y, V -U  = Z, FZ C Y, AZ  =U-FZ,  U~ = Fa-FZ  
for a = 1, 2. If both F1 and F: are consistent faults sets, then for any ui E AZ, 
F- lu i  C U [6] as shown in Figure 4. 
We are going to utilising the above results in the next section. 
0 
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Figure 4. 
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4. CHARACTERISAT ION OF p -  t REL IABLE  SYSTEM 
In this section, we proceed to derive the necessary and sufficient conditions for probabilistic 
t-reliable systems. 
LEMMA 1. (See [2].) I f  system S represents by a graph G = (V, E) is p -  t reliable, then Case (i) 
for each u~ C V, (1 - pj)w(ui) + w(F- lu i )  > k(t) and Case (ii) for each uj E V, p~ < 1/2. 
PROOF. For any ui E V, if the system is p - t reliable, then we must have w(ui U F- lu i )  > k(t), 
else both F - lu i  and ui U F - lu i  can become consistent fault sets. On using (7) 
w (ui U F - lu i )  = (1 - pj)w(ui) + w (F- iu~),  
(10) 
so (1 - pj)w(ui) ÷ w (F- lu i )  > k(t), 
where the first part (1 - pj)w(ui) is minimum for maximum value of pj. 
To prove the necessity of Case (ii), we refer to Figure 3 where the entropy function H(ui)  is 
drawn against p~. The slope w(u~) > 0 for p~ < 1/2. However, for p~ >_ (1/2), w(u~) < 0 whereby 
relation (10) will be violated, and hence, both F - lu i  and ui t2 F - lu i  can be consistent fault sets. 
The physical interpretation of relation (ii) of this lemma can be derived from the following dis- 
cussion. Here we are using the expression for the entropy (i.e., average information) which utilises 
the Shanons [7] formula and which is negative of thermodynamic entropy [8]. In a thermodynamic 
process, the situation in which entropy increases (i.e., slope of the entropy is positive) is called 
irreversible. The positive slope of the thermodynamic entropy is analogous to the negative or 
zero slope of the entropy function for any computer ui E V with pi -> 1/2. Thus, the irreversible 
process of a thermodynamic system is equivalent to an unreliable network system in the present 
case. 
The concept of one-separable partition described in [6] is used in the following Lemmas 2 and 3 
which state the necessary and sufficient condition and another sufficient condition respectively of
p - t reliability. 
DEFINITION 3. A digraph is called one-separable if there exists a partition V1, V2 of V such that 
for all ui 6 V1, [F- lui  N V2[ _> 1 and for all uj 6 V2, [F- luj  N Vii ~__ 1. 
LEMMA 2. A system represented by a digraph G = (V, E) is p - t reliable if for all u~ c V, 
(1 - pj), w(ui) + w(F- lu i )  > k(t) and G has no one-separable induced subgraph. 
PROOF. As per Lemma 1, for p - t reliability, we must have (ui U p - lu i )  > k(t). Now for any 
fault F with w(F)  < k(t), we have w(F U r-~F) > k(t). This is true because for any computer 
ui E F, F - lu i  ~ F, and F - lu i  C_ F U F -1F  - ui, 
so ui U F - lu i  C_ F U F - ' F ,  and hence, w (F U F -1F)  > k(t). 
Now we show that the second condition is sufficient for p - t reliability. For any F with w(F)  > 
k(t), if two consistent fault sets F1 and F2 exists, then relation (9) is true. Also for any F~ (a -- 1 
or 2) there is a computer ui E F~ for which F - lu i  C F~ since no one-separable induced subgraph 
exists. Since (10) is true, w(F~) > k(t). So there cannot exists a situation where w(F~) < k(t), 
where a --. 1, 2. Thus the sufficiency is proved. 
LEMMA 3. A system represented by a digraph G = (V, E) is p -  t reliable if (i) for every U C V 
with ~eu w(ui) = 2k(t) - r, 0 _< r < k(t), Z = V - U, AZ  = U - FZ and for any computer 
uj c AZ,  F - lu j  C_ U we have ~-~erz  w(ui) > r. 
PROOF. To prove the sufficiency of the condition, we suppose S is not p - t reliable. There exists 
two consistent fault sets F1 and F2 satisfying relation (9). But ~ev w(ui) = 2k(t) - r (given), 
or 
uiEF1 uiEF2 u iEY  
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Since FZ  _C Y, we have 
uiEF1 uiEF2 uICFZ 
Now if ~-~u~erz w(ui) > r, there cannot be a situation where ~,eFo  w(ui) <_ k(t), a = 1, or 2. 
The necessary and sufficient condition is stated in the following theorem for the systems where 
there are one-separable induced subgraph. 
THEOREM 1. A system represented by a diagraph G = (V, E) is p - t reliable iff 
(i) for any ui E V, uj E F-lui, (1 - pj)w(ui) + w(F- lu i )  > k(t); 
(ii) for any ui E V, pi < 1/2; and 
(iii) for any U C V with Z = V-  U, AZ = U-  FZ, ~ ,ev  W(Ui) = 2k(t) - r, 0 < r < k(t) 
whenever ~-~.u~erz w(ui) ~ r, then 
pj~(u~) > ~ w(u~), where {Ui, U~} 
u~EAZ u ' ,EU1 
is any one-separable partition of AZ, so that 
PROOF. The necessity of the first two conditions is established in Lemma 1. To prove the 
necessity of (iii), we suppose that  Condition (iii) is not satisfied and there may exist two consistent 
fault sets F1 and F2 satisfying relation (9) as shown in Figure 4. Now for p - t reliability if one- 
separable part it ion of AZ  exists and Eu~eF1 w(ui) ~ k(t), then we must have EuiEF2 W(ui) > 
k(t). 
Representing Ua ~ = F~ - FZ,  a = 1, or 2, we have 
u, EF~ uiEU[~ u, EFZ ( l la )  
uIEAZ u~EU~ u~EU~ 
E w(ui)= E pjw(ui)+ E (1 -p j )w(u i ) .  ( l lb )  
uiEAZ u iEAZ u~EAZ 
From X:~u w(u~) = 2k(t)  - r or ~,erz  w(u~) + ~,~Az(1  - p¢)w(u~) + E~,e~zpjW(u~) = 
2k(t) - r. For ~-~-~eF1 w(ui) = k(t), we get from above relations, 
~_, w(u~)=k(t)-(r- X: ~(~i)/' so 
u~EF2 u~EFZ / 
E w(ui) <_ k(t), if E w(ui) <_ r. 
uiEF 2 uIEI~Z 
(11c) 
For every ui E AZ,  we have F-lui C_ U else both F1 and F2 cannot be consistent fault sets. So 
w(U) > k(t). Utilising (7), 
~(u) = ~ (1 -p~)~(u~) + ~ ~(ui) > k(t). 
uiEAZ u~EFZ 
(12) 
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Relations (11c) and (12) leads to 
(1-;~)~(u,) > ~ ~(u~), 
u~EAZ u~EU~ 
and from relations ( l la)  and ( l lb) ,  we get 
Z P~(~') < Z ~(~)" 
u~EAZ uiEU~ 
So, for p - t reliability, it is necessary to have 
p~(~) >_ ~ ~(~). 
u~EAZ uiEU~ 
(13) 
To prove sufficiency, if (13) is true, then 
(1-pj~(~) < ~ ~(u~), 
u~EAZ u~EU~ 
and from (12), 
Z ~(u,) > k(t). 
u~EF2 
On assigning equal probability to each computer, the condition of this theorem leads to funda- 
mental results of a T-diagnosable system proposed so far. These results are detailed in Section 6. 
We shall be using Lemma 2, Lemma 3, and Theorem 1 for testing the p - t reliability of G. For 
the time being, let us concentrate on the optimal design of a p - t reliable system. 
5. OPT IMAL  DES IGN OF  A p - t  REL IABLE  SYSTEM 
In this section, we deal with the following problem. 
Given a set of computers {ui}, i -- 1, 2 , . . . ,  each computer ui having a probability of failure 
pi < 1/2. If we design the p - t reliable system, taking into account he highest probability 
of failure (Pi) to each computer ui E V, the system will continue to be p - t reliable for other 
smaller values of Pi. The question is, how these computers should be interconnected by test links 
so that the system represented by the resulting diagnostic graph G = (V, E) is p - t reliable 
with minimum number of test links. We utilise the results of earlier theorem to develop the 
optimal design. A few terminologies used for this purpose are defined below for any diagnostic 
graph G(V, E). 
For any ui E V, we define a set Sa(~ ) as Sa(~) = {S~il, S~i2. • • } where S~ia (a = 1, 2 . . .  ) C V. 
Each Sai~ is a predecessor set of ui, satisfies the relation (10). For a = 0, [S0il[ = [S0i2[ . . . . .  
Cmin where each I Soia [ denotes the minimum number of predecessor computers necessary for ui 
to satisfy relation (10). For a ¢ 0, Sai~ also satisfies the relation (10) but IS~i~[ = Cmin -~ a; 
e.g., in Figure 5, 
So(u~) = {{u l ,~2},{u l ,~3},{~2,~3}},  
31(u5) = {{Ul,U2,u3},{Ul,U2, u4},{u2,u3, u4},{Ul,U3,~4} }. 
A set U c V, having the following properties i  defined as a testable set: 
w(u~) = 2k(t) - r, 
u~EU 
o < r < k(t), 
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~(us) = log(2) 
" - - - - ~ ~ , ~  u 2) = log(5] 
- ~(u 3) = log(5) 




where Z = V-U ,  and there ex is tsaF1UF2 = U, F1NF2 =Y,  V -U  = Z, U" = Fa -FZ  
where a = 1, 2 and U~UU~ = AZ. Partition F1, F2 of U satisfying F1 U F2 = U, F1 F] F2 = Y, 
V - U = Z, U" = Fa - FZ  where a = 1, 2 and U~UU~ = AZ as shown in Figure 4. However, all 
types of edges noted in this figure may not be present. For each testable set U c V, any of the 
following relations hould be satisfied for p - t reliability along with the relation (10): 
RI: there is no one-separable induced subgraph {U~, U~} for any AZ; 
R2: the relation noted in Condition (iii) of Theorem 1; and 
R3: ~,~rz  w(u~) > r. 
In order to reduce the computational time for searching testable sets out of V, we define a base 
set B c V such that ~u,eB w(ui) > 2k(t) and F -1B = ¢. So two consistent fault sets F1 and 
F2 (F1 U F2 : B) with ~-~.u{eF~ w(ui) <_ k(t), (a : 1, 2) cannot exist. However, for any graph 
corresponding to a base set B, we may have following three types of testable sets where none of 




: whereU~nB#¢,  F2nB#¢,  
: where U~ _C V-  B; and 
: where F2 _C V - B. 
If any of the above types of testable sets exists in a graph G -- (V, E) representing a system S, 
then the system is not p - t reliable. We now outline a Procedure P1 by which the system can 
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be made to be p - t reliable by addition of minimum number of extra test links subject to the 
fact that the relation (10) is satisfied for each ui E V. However, if relation (10) is satisfied then 
relation R1 will automatically get satisfied for Types 2 and 3 testable sets. 
PROCEDURE P1. Input- - for  any diagnostic graph G = (V, E), U is testable set of Type 1, for 
any ui • U, S~(ui) = {S~1, S~2, . . . ,  } and F - lu i  = S~ia, a = 1, 2 . . . ,  and as described earlier 
the cardinality of the predecessor set for ui is Cmin + a where a -- 0, 1, 2 , . . . .  
Step 1. For each ui E U execute - .  
A. Delete all incoming test links to ui. 
B. If all members of Sa(ui) is processed in this substep go to Step 2, else go to Substep lc. 
C. For each Saia which is not yet processed in this substep, execute: 
CI: with each member of S~a = F-lug, connection is made with u~; 
C2: if any of the relations R1, R2, R3 (whichever may be earlier) get satisfied for U 
go to Step 3, else go to Substep 1A. 
Step 2. a ~- (~ + 1 and go hack to Step 1. 
Step 3. Stop. 
It is obvious that Procedure P1 adds minimum number of extra test links to the nodes of U 
such that any one of the relation R= (a -- 1, 2, 3) is satisfied. It is the central feature of the 
following algorithmic steps to design a p - t reliable system with minimum number of test links. 
ALGORITHM A. 
Step 1. Arrange the modules so that w(ul) >_ w(u2).., where ul,u2.. ,  is the given set of 
computers c~ *-- 0. 
Step 2. With minimum number of nodes find a set B so that 
E W(Ui) > 2k(t), Ui E {Ul ,U2. . .} .  
uIEB 
Step 3. For each ui • {ul, u2. . .  } find Sa(u~) = {Sail, S~i2,... } such that Sai~ = F - lu i  C_ 
B, a = 1, 2 , . . .  and with each member of F - lu i  connection is made with ui. 
Step 4. Execute Procedure P1 for each testable set U of Type 1. 
Step 5. Stop. 
In Figure 5, we have five modules shown interconnected as per Step 3. The base set B = 
{ul, u2, u3} and a testable set U = {ul, u2, } of Type 1 exists. As per Substep lc of Procedure P1, 
the graph of Figure 5a is modified to Figure 5b whereby no testable set of Type 1 exists and it 
represents a p - t reliable system with minimum number of test links. 
The computational complexity of Algorithm A clearly depends on the complexity of the search 
for identifying testable sets of Type 1 in Step 4. By introducing the base set B in Step 2, we 
have tried to restrict the complexity of this search. However, we failed to arrive at any definite 
complexity measure. 
THEOREM 2. For a given value of t and a set of computers {ui}, i = 1, 2 . . .  each having a 
probability of failure Pi < 1/2, execution of the Algorithm A leads to a p - t reliable system with 
minimum number of test links. 
PROOF. In Step 3 of the algorithm, each module ui is connected by minimum number of test 
links satisfying relation (10) which is necessary for p - t reliability. Since ~u~eB w(ui) > 2k(t), 
no two consistent fault sets F1, F2 (F1 U F 2 ---- B) with ~u,eFo w(ui) < k(t), a -- 1, 2 can 
exist. For any testable set U C V - B, there cannot be any situation where relation R1 is not 
valid. Consequently in Step 4, each testable set of Type 1, which may exist is treated as per 
Procedure P1 whereby by addition of minimum number of extra test links any one of the relations 
R1, -R2, R3 (whichever may be the earlier) is made to satisfy. If any one of these relations is valid 
for each testable set, as per Lemmas 2, 3, and Theorem 1, the system is p - t reliable. Lemmas 2 
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and 3 are the sufficient condition of p - t reliability whereas Theorem 1 is the necessary and 
sufficient conditions of p - t reliability. So for each testable set relation R2 (i.e., Theorem 1) is 
tried first, and hence, the proof of the theorem. 
In the present section, by utilising preliminary results of information theory we have developed 
a new approach for analysis and design of a p - t reliable system. On assigning equal probability 
of failure this approach can also be applied to existing self-diagnosable system models. In the 
following section, we proceed to derive a few fundamental results of most of the models on the 
basis of this new approach. 
6. RESULTS OF 
OTHER SELF-DIAGNOSABLE SYSTEM MODELS FROM 
INFORMATION THEORETIC APPROACH 
MODEL 1. Analysis of Maheswari and Hakimi's model [6]. 
The modifications necessary to fit our model to the model proposed in Section 7 is tas follows. 
(i) For any set of computers F, instead of having the relation w(F) = Eu~EF w(ui), we have 
come out with the result 
w(F )= E w(ui) + E (1 -  pj)w(ui); 
uiEF uiEF 
F-lui~F tujEF-luiCF 
(ii) instead of having the relation P(F) > t (and hence, 0 < w(F) < k(t)), we have assumed 
P(F) >_ t whereby we have 
0 < w(F) <_ k(t). 
We now proceed to derive a few similar results of [6] in the light of our approach. The following 
theorem is a sufficient condition of p - t reliability where no two computers test each other which 
is analogous with [6, Theorem 3.2]. 
THEOREM 3. A system S with digraph G = (V, E) in which all cycles are of length greater than 
two is p - t reliable if 
(X~PJ)w(ud+w(r-lud>k(t), [oruiEV and ujer-lu~. 
PROOF. From our approach o fp -  t reliability, for any computer ui we need to have w(uiU(F -1 
u~)) > k(t) (using Lemma 1). Now using relation (7) and since no loop of length two exists 
so  
(1 - pj)w(ui) + w (F- lu i  > k(t), (14) 
where (uj E F- lu i )  and 
( r - lad  = w(uJ) + 
ujEF- lu i  
F-luj~=F-lu i 
Now if the given condition of the theorem is true, relation (14) will be true and also we note 
that if i14) is true then for any fault set F with w(F) <_ kit ) we shall have w( F U F - IF )  > kit ). 
Also for any set of computers U with wiU ) > kit), if two consistent fault sets obeying (9) (as 




(1 - ; )w(u j ) .  
ujEF-lul 
F-lujCF-lu~ 
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Now since AZ = U~ U U~, 
uiEU~ u~EU~ uIEFZ 
or 
w(F1) + w(F2) > 2k(t). 
So if w(F1) <_ k(t), then w(F2) > k(t). Hence, the given condition is sufficient for p- t  reliability. 
We note that this sufficient condition is very close to the necessary condition given in rela- 
tion (10). But neither the relation (10) is sufficient (even for the case when no two computers 
test each other) nor the condition of Theorem 3 is necessary for p - t reliability. 
All other theorems noted in [6] can be given shape in the light of our approach. For example, 
the proof of [6, Theorem 3.8] can be explained in a way similar to that of Theorem 1. 
MODEL 2. Analysis of PMCs model [1]. 
Only modification ecessary to fit our model to that of PMC is to assign equal probability of 
failure to each computer whereby for ui, uj ... E V, 
1 
Pi =Pj  . . . . .  p < ~ and w(ui) = w(uj)  . . . .  w(u). 
The relation (8) gets modified to 
w(u ) = IFIw(  ) < k(t), 
uiEF 
where IFI denotes the number of faulty computers in F. We denote [k(t)lw(u~)J by T (where LA] 
denotes greatest integer not greater than A) the maximum number of faulty computers allowable 
in any fault set. 
Using our approach, we now prove the necessary and sufficient conditions of T-diagnosability 
of PMCs model. 
THEOREM 4. (See [1, Theorem 1].) Let S be a system of n modules with the property that no 
two computers test each other. Then S is T-diagnosable iff each computer is tested by T other 
computers in S. 
PROOF. From Lemma 1, we must have 
where in the given system w(F-lu~) < ~-~.ujer-l~ w(uj). 
Denoting the cardinality of 
F- lu i ,  by [F-luil , 
IF-lui[ > T - (1 - p), 
since (1 -p )  < i for0 <p< 1/2, IF-lull >_T. 
Again from Theorem 3, (1 -p j /2 )w(u i )+ w(F-lu~) > k(t) is sufficient for p -  t diagnosability 
whereby 
IF'lu~[ > T 1 -p j  so IF- 'ui l  > T. 
Hence, Theorem 5 follows. 
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THEOREM 5. (See [6, Theorem 2].) Let G(V, E) be the digraph of a system S of n computers. 
Then S is T diagnosable iff 
(i) F- lu i [  >_ T, for all ui E V, 
(ii) for each integer l = [r/w(u)], where 0 ~ r < k(t) and each U C V with ~u~eg w(ui) = 
2k(t) - rlFZ I > r where Z = V - U, and 
• (iii) n>_2T+l .  
PROOF. The necessity of (i) follows from the basic relation w(uiUF-lui) > k(t) noted in 
Lemma 1 whereby by relation (7) 
Z (uj) + E (1 -p )w(u j )  > k(t) (1 - p)w(ui) + or 
ujEr - lu l  u jEF- lu i  
F-luj~=uiUF-lu~ F-lujC_u~t3F-lul 
 (uj) > k(t) - (1 + 
ujEF- lu, uj EF- l ul 
F-lus~uiUI~-lUi 
To find the lowest limit of ]F-luil, dividing both sides by w(ui) and since third term _> 0, we 
[F-lui[ > T -  (1 "p ) ,  so 
1 
]F-luiI _> T, since fo rP<2,  (1 -p )< l .  
To prove the necessity of (ii) ,we utilise relation (9) (in Figure 4) where two consistent faults F1 
get 
and F2 exist in U. For any set of computers U with FZ = ¢, we have 
w(g) = (1 -  ;) 
uiEU 
= (1 - p)(2k(t) - r), 
max{w(U)} = 2(1 - p)k(t), 
So, for p - t reliability, it is necessary to have 
w(U) > 2(1 - p)k(t). 
Now, on using relation (7), for a general system as shown in Figure 4, 
using given condition 
since 0 _< r < k(t). 




So putting this value in the earlier expression 
w(U) : (1 -  p)(2k(t) - r) + p E w(ui). 
u~EFZ 
Now, to satisfy (13), we must have 
P E w(ui) > (1 -p) r ,  so 
u~EFZ 
1-p  
Z w(ui) > r, 
u~EFZ P 
Z w(ui) > r, since 1 -p  > 1. 
ui~FZ P 
(15) 
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Thus, the necessity is established, to prove the sufficiency, we have 
ui EU ul EF1 u~ EF2 u iEY  
since FZ C Y, 
u~EFZ u~EY u~EF1 u~EF: u~EFZ 
so for > + Z > 2k(t). 
u~EFZ u~EF1 uiEF2 
(16) 
So two consistent fault sets with ~,~eF1 w(ui) < k(t), ~-~,eF: w(ui) <_ k(t) cannot exist in U, 
whereby the sufficiency is proved. Relation (iii) follows from the relation (16). 
7. DYNAMIC  DES IGN AND 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this paper, we are using the expression for the entropy (i.e., average information) which 
utilises Shanon's formula [7] and this is negative of thermodynamic entropy [8]. Lemma I demon- 
strated that the irreversible process of a thermodynamic system is equivalent to a a unreliable 
network system in the present case. 
In the previous section, we have seen that on assigning equal probability of failure to each 
computer, the probabilistically--t reliable system is becoming T-fault diagnosable (or reliable) 
system. This means that in the event of maximum T number of faulty computers being faulty, the 
system is able to automatically diagnose the faulty computers. Now on using Dahbura Masson's 
0(x 2"5) diagnosis algorithm [9] we can find out which computers are exactly faulty. 
For example, we start with all fault free computers, i.e., 
1 2 3 . . .  n 
0 0 0 ...  0 
and land up with 
123  . . . . . .  n 
01001001. . .  0 
where 2 nd, 5 th, and 8 TM computers are faulty. Now, if we consider each computers priori proba- 
bility of failure being p, then the probability of reaching the mentioned failure pattern from all 
fault free pattern is 
p = pT'(1 _ p)n-T' 
where n -- total number of computers and T' = no. of faulty computer = 3 (here). 
Now, P is maximised when p = Tt /n  because ~pdP • 0 at p = Tt/n.  Also, ~ < 0. 
Finding a priori probability of failure is a problem remains to be solved. Following the earlier 
discussion, we propose that presently the priori probability of failure is p = TI /n  in the example 
as mentioned above. 
Note that this assignment of priori probability of failure is dynamic in nature because the 
number of faulty computers (T I) may get changed anytime. Thus, we bring the dynamic design 
scenario f a reliable computer network. 
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